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Building bridges? What role for the EU in post-war Iraq?
ow that the war in Iraq is 
officially over, the EU must 
consider what role it can play in 
post-war reconstruction. Thus 
far the Union has reacted swiftly 
to the humanitarian crisis but 
not yet defined the part that it 
will play in the stabilisation and 
institution building processes. 
With the US announcement that
an interim administration should 
be in place in Iraq by June the 
pressure is on to define the EU’s 
role in the reconstruction of Iraq 
and build bridges within its own 
CFSP.
First response: 
humanitarian aid
Between 1992 and 2003 ECHO 
provided €157 million in
humanitarian assistance to Iraq, 
making it the largest single
donor of humanitarian aid to the 
country. Although unable to
finance pre-positioning of aid
prior to the start of hostilities,
ECHO began preparing for a
possible war as early as
September 2002 when a Task
Force was established to
undertake contingency planning. 
As soon as war broke out on 21 
March, ECHO pledged €21
million in aid to Iraq from its
regular budget and announced
its intention to secure €79
million of additional funding
from the emergency reserve.
The European Parliament
approved this funding on 9
th
April. So far €22.5 million of
these funds have been disbursed. 
On March 21
st
, acting under the 
‘fast track’ emergency
procedure, ECHO released €3
million of aid to the
International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) for the distribution of emergency 
supplies. On 8
th
 April €9.5 million was released to
implementing partners including ICRC, Premiere
Urgènce and UNICEF to tackle food and water
shortages and to finance basic repairs and back-up
generators for hospitals, while a further €10 million 
was released on 22nd April to support hospitals and
other medical services. This aid was to be airlifted to 
Iraq on 27
th
 April but the flight was delayed until 6
May due to problems with the original flight plan.
In the case of Iraq EU aid has been released with
unprecedented speed. However, problems of security
and access have hampered its distribution, particularly 
during the early weeks of the war. Although the
security situation has begun to improve, NGOs insist 
that the coalition must do much more to ensure the 
orderly delivery of humanitarian aid. Moreover, NGOs 
(including ECHO partners) are adamant that the UN
must takeover management of the aid effort in Iraq. 
They are especially concerned by the lack of an
independent authorisation process for NGO activities
in the country. ECHO Commissioner, Poul Nielsen has 
written to Kofi Annan supporting the NGO
community’s request for a system of UN authorisation 
for NGOs working in Iraq. However, the issue has yet 
to be resolved and represents just one more question, 
which will remain unanswered as long as the role of 
the UN in post-war Iraq remains undefined. In the
meantime, Commissioner Nielsen is visiting Iraq on 6-
7 May to explore the possibility of establishing a
Humanitarian Aid Office in Baghdad. On departure he 
once again stressed the need for the UN to play a
central role in co-ordinating the aid effort.
Reconstruction: awaiting an ‘appropriate’
international framework
The 14
th
 April External Relations Council gave
member states their first opportunity formally to
discuss the situation in Iraq since the outbreak of war. 
At this meeting ministers discussed papers, presented 
by the Commission/Presidency and the Secretary
General/High Representative, outlining the range of
policy instruments available to the EU for
reconstruction in Iraq. Two days later on 16 April, the 
EU issued a statement on Iraq following the Informal 
European Council in Athens (which UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan also attended). In their statement 
the EU leaders affirmed their commitment to play a 
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‘significant role’ in the political and economic
reconstruction of the country and called for the UN to 
play a ‘central role including in the process leading
toward self-government for the Iraqi people’.
1
However, although further discussions were held on
this subject at the Informal General Affairs and
External Relations Council in Rhodes on 2-3 May
2
 the 
EU could come to no firmer conclusion than an
agreement to ‘contribute to the definition of a central 
UN role in Iraq’. This rather elastic phrase indicates
that member states are still not agreed on key issues 
such as whether any interim government requires a UN 
mandate or what should be done about weapons
inspections.
However, given that these questions will be settled in
New York rather than Brussels, such divisions need
not necessarily frustrate EU reconstruction efforts once 
an international framework is in place. The
Commission/Presidency paper on reconstruction
identifies three possible phases of EU involvement in
Iraq, if the ‘international framework is acceptable’.
The instruments proposed include humanitarian aid
and civilian police missions (phase 1), institution
building, economic assistance and support for civil
society (phase 2) and support for structural reform of 
the economy (phase 3).
3
As no formal decisions can be 
made at this time, the Council has agreed that the
External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten should
make some initial assessments regarding humanitarian
aid, reconstruction assistance and co-operation with
International Financial Institutions. Any further action
is dependent on developments at the UN and clear
political direction from the Council. 
Inevitably, the lack of an agreed international
framework for action in Iraq will make the EU’s
response to the Iraqi reconstruction slower than it was 
in Afghanistan or East Timor. As Patten himself has 
pointed out, it is important to bear in mind that
irrespective of divisions within the Union it will be
difficult for the EU to act swiftly in cases where the 
legitimacy of the international framework in which it 
is being called to act is in question.
5
Stabilisation: no common approach
Whatever the EU may contribute to the reconstruction 
of Iraq in terms of civilian crisis management
capabilities, it is certain that there will be no EU
military contribution to the stabilisation process.
Indeed, it is over the issue of a multi-national
stabilisation force that current and future member
states are now most divided. On 30 April the UK
Defence Minister, Geoff Hoon, hosted a meeting of 16
countries who will contribute to a stabilisation force. 
The UK Ministry of Defence has not issued a full list 
of countries present at the meeting. However, whilst 
neither France nor Germany attended, other current
and prospective EU member states, including Denmark 
and Poland were present and it is thought that several 
more will take part in the stabilisation force. Denmark 
and Italy have already demonstrated their readiness to 
contribute to such a force by pledging troops and other 
personnel to serve in post-war Iraq.
6
 According to the 
latest US plans, Poland has been asked to take
command of one of the three military sectors into
which Iraq is to be divided. A further meeting of troop 
contributing countries is to be held in London on 8
May. It is still not clear whether the US intends to seek 
a UN mandate for the stabilisation force but this looks 
unlikely.
Building bridges?
Although the EU has reacted with commendable speed 
to the humanitarian crisis in Iraq, it has so far been
unable to make the necessary decisions about its role 
in the post-war reconstruction process. With no
consensus within the Union as to the legitimacy of the 
war, the EU has looked to the UN to legitimise the
post-war reconstruction framework. Until the UN’s
role is defined, a process, which depends as much on 
the US as the EU, concerted action by the EU will be 
delayed.
In the meantime the EU must try to bridge the gaps, 
which the Iraq crisis has opened in its CFSP.  This will 
not be an easy task but might be aided by the recent 
publication of the road map for the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process. The EU has long been united in its view 
that the problems of the Middle East should not be
addressed in isolation and that a solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is imperative. Perhaps the re-
launch of this long stalled peace process will give the 
EU a chance to build bridges of its own.
______________________________
1 Presidency’s Statement on Iraq, Athens 16/04/03, 
www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/4/17/2538
2 The Rhodes Informal Council was attended by the foreign 
ministers of the 15 member states and the 10 states, which will join 
the EU in 2004. 
3 See Informal General Affairs and External Relations Council 
(Gymnich): Press Statement, Rhodes 03/05/03 at 
http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/5/3/2662/
4See Contribution of the European Commission and the Greek 
Presidency: Options for a significant EU role in reconstruction in 
Iraq 02/05/03 at http://www.eu2 003.gr/en/articles/2003/5/2/2653/
5 See Informal General Affairs and External Relations Council 
(Gymnich): Presidency Press Conference, Rhodes 02/05/03 at
http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/5/3/2661/
6 On 11 April Denmark pledged to send 400 military personnel to 
Iraq to contribute to post-war stabilisation. On 15 April the Italian 
parliament voted to send up to 3,000 military personnel to Iraq 
including combat troops and military police. 
Catriona Mace
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The Convention: Conclusion without closure
On 23 April the Praesidium of the European 
Convention presented its proposals for Draft Articles 
on external action. These will be included, perhaps 
with minor revisions, in the Convention’s proposal for 
a Constitutional Treaty to be concluded in June and 
decided upon in the next Intergovernmental 
Conference in 20041. The proposals, which combine 
the recommendations of the two working groups on 
external action and defence, seek to encourage 
convergence and mutual solidarity, while recognising 
that the development of a common foreign and security 
policy will rely on actions undertaken by coalitions of 
the willing. The proposals thereby contain a mix of 
institutional innovations that are designed to improve 
the coherence of EU external action while at the same 
time bringing increased co-operation between sub-
groups of member states within the framework of the 
EU.
EU Foreign Minister to increase coherence 
The difficulty of achieving coherence of EU action
across policy sectors and between member states is
well known and was one of the challenges for the
Convention. At least in form, the new Treaty will
provide a more coherent overview of how the EU can 
act on the international scene. This is reflected in the 
simplified structure of the text, the comprehensive
statement of objectives and the explicit statement that 
‘the Union shall ensure consistency between the
different areas of its external action’ (Article 1). 
The principal institutional innovation to help deliver
coherence, in substance, is the proposal to create the
position of EU Foreign Minister. This position spans 
both inter-governmental (Council) and supranational
(European Commission) institutional structures by
bringing together the functions of High Representative 
of CFSP and Commissioner for External Relations.
The Minister would be appointed by the Council in
agreement with the President of the Commission and
would ‘contribute to the elaboration of and be in
charge of the implementation of CFSP/ESDP, for
which he/she would receive a mandate from the
Council…and, have specific responsibilities in
external relations (former 1
st
 pillar issues) as a member 
of the Commission’. 
The Minister would also be granted new powers.
These include the right of initiative in the field of
CFSP, which would be exercised jointly with the
Commission when the proposal concerned an area of 
Community competence. Moreover, the Minister
would be in charge of the negotiation of CFSP
agreements, be empowered to ensure coordination of
member states’ positions in international organisations
and represent the Union in these bodies. With regards 
the United Nations Security Council, Article 14 calls 
for member states that sit on the Security Council to 
request that the Minister present the Union’s position 
in cases where the Union has a defined position on a 
subject on the agenda. Within the Council’s decision-
making structures, the Minister would chair the
Foreign Affairs Council.
The creation of a ‘double-hatted’ position of EU
Foreign Minister does not, however, fundamentally
change the underlying structure of the EU. While the 
Presidency will have less of a role in CFSP, which
may in practice improve continuity, the
intergovernmental character of CFSP and extent of the 
Commission’s competencies remain unaltered. Hence, 
no matter how gifted the first incumbent will be, it is 
unlikely that he or she will be able to deliver
convergence where member states positions diverge or 
coherence where competencies are contested between 
the institutions, as in the area of civilian crisis
management for example.
Enshrining the intergovernmental approach
While many agree that the principal obstacle to the
development of common policies in the area of
CFSP/ESDP is the fact that unanimity is required for 
decisions taken by member states in the Council, the 
Convention does not recommend deep reform in the
EU’s decision-making procedures. Unanimity remains 
the general rule and the use of Qualified Majority
Voting (QMV) is often itself qualified. For example, 
QMV continues to apply to decisions that implement a 
European Council decision relating to the Union’s
strategic interests and objectives in a particular
country, region or theme. However, member states
also maintain the right to veto such implementing
decisions ‘for important and stated reasons of national 
policy’. QMV will nevertheless be extended to apply
to decisions on joint proposals by the Minister and
Commission. The Convention also provides for the
extension of QMV to CFSP in the future in a clause 
that would enable member states to decide this without 
requiring Treaty revisions.
The decision-making status quo is also maintained
with regard to the role of the European Parliament 
(EP). While it is now explicitly granted the right to be 
consulted on matters relating to ESDP, there are no
provisions for increasing its powers to hold the Union 
to account for actions undertaken in CFSP and/or
ESDP. Its role in approving international commercial
agreements has, however, been strengthened.
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Enabling, but not requiring greater defence 
co-operation
There are a number of innovations in the area of
Defence. The list of crisis management tasks, the so-
called Petersberg Tasks, has been extended. These
tasks now include ‘ joint disarmament operations,
humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and
assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping
tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peacemaking, support action in combating
terrorism at the request of a third country, and post-
conflict stabilisation’ (Article 17). Article 18 also
allow for greater flexibility for groups of states to
implement such tasks within the Union framework.
While the decision to undertake an operation must be
taken unanimously, by all 25 member states, it will
entrust implementation to a smaller group of named
countries. To enable EU operations to be undertaken
more rapidly, a new mechanism will allow civilian
actions to be financed more swiftly from the
Community budget and a fund of member states
contributions will be established to finance the start-up
costs of a military operation.
A ‘solidarity clause’ has also been introduced in the
Constitution. This falls short of a collective defence
commitment. Rather, it commits the Union to mobilise 
its resources to address the terrorist threat from non-
state actors, and ensures that member states will come 
to the assistance of a member that has been attacked
and requests assistance. The proposals nevertheless
provide for member states that want to enter into more 
binding commitments with each other, including
undertakings in improving military capabilities and
defence commitments as contained in Article V of the 
Brussels Treaty, to do so in the framework of the EU. 
Such structured co-operation would be provided for in 
a Declaration, signed by participating member states, 
annexed to the Constitution. Another innovation
designed to improve convergence in the area of
defence and improve military capabilities is the
proposal to establish an Agency for Armaments and
Strategic Research. This would bring into the EU
framework work that is currently undertaken to
increase harmonisation and encourage multilateral
projects in other organisations i.e. OCCAR and the
Framework Agreement
2
. More controversially, it
would ‘support’ defence technology research, which
has never been financed from the Community budget 
before.
A higher profile for the EU abroad?
With regard to the more established areas of EU
external action, notably its development co-operation,
commercial policy and humanitarian action there are
relatively few substantial changes. In general, the
articles call for greater complementarity between EU
policies and those of member states. There is also a 
new proposal for the establishment of a ‘European
Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps’ and a proposal
that Commission delegations be transformed into
Union delegations, which falls short of
recommendations to establish an EU diplomatic
service. The articles on sanctions policy have been
refined so that EU sanctions can now target physical 
and legal persons as well as states.
A halfway house solution
The Draft Articles are perhaps less ambitious than
might otherwise have been delivered had it not been
for the Iraq crisis, which demonstrated the limits of 
CFSP. They do not address the structural problems that 
beset the CFSP project, notably the difficulty of
getting member states unanimously to agree to
common approaches and the challenge of delivering
complementary and timely action through the mixed
and often contested executives of the Commission and 
the member states. Europe’s new Constitution is
therefore unlikely to deliver the coherence of action
that many integrationists were hoping for. Neither is 
the legitimacy of external action likely to be enhanced
through increased efficiency or improved mechanisms 
of accountability. 
_______________________________
1 See Draft Articles on External Action in the Constitutional Treaty 
CONV 685/03, 23 April 2003
http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00685.en03.pdf
2 See Jocelyn Mawdsley’s article in this issue. 
Catriona Gourlay
The defence mini summit: Deepening division or enhancing co-operation?
On 29 April the Heads of State of Belgium, France, 
Germany and Luxembourg met to discuss further co-
operation in European Defence. Despite their 
insistence that this initiative is intended only to 
strengthen EU defence as part of the European pillar 
of NATO, the so-called ‘mini-summit’ has met with 
strong criticism from both the US and UK, who have 
characterised the event as divisive and unhelpful. 
Undoubtedly the timing of this initiative is unfortunate 
in that it appears to entrench divisions within the 
Union. However, an examination of the proposals 
made at the summit indicates that, with the exception 
of the controversial proposal for a European collective
planning capability, there is not a great deal in this 
initiative that is new or radical.
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Familiar territory: proposals to the Convention
In their end of summit statement the quartet make
several proposals for the Convention, many of which
are sim ple restatements of ideas already submitted to
the Defence Working Group. These ideas, which
include the establishment of enhanced co-operation in
defence matters, the reformulation of the Petersburg
Tasks, the creation of a European Agency for the
development and acquisition of military capabilities
and the adoption of a solidarity clause, are not
particularly controversial. Indeed many of them have
been incorporated into the Draft Articles on External 
Action presented to the Convention on 24/25 April.
1
Admittedly, the nature of the solidarity clause
proposed in the summit statement is a little unclear. By 
invoking “all kinds of risks” it appears to fudge the
distinction between a solidarity clause committing
member states to mutual assistance in the event of
terrorist attack and a common defence commitment, 
such as that contained in article V of the Brussels
Treaty. The latter remains a sensitive issue both for
neutral member states and those who reject
‘competition’ with NATO. However, these issues are 
not new and it seems likely that in framing the
constitutional treaty the Intergovernmental Conference
(IGC) will adopt a solidarity clause narrowly defined
and a mutual defence commitment annexed as a
Declaration, which member states may choose to ratify 
or not. This is the approach adopted in the Draft
Articles on External Action produced by the
Convention.
Indeed, the only idea put forward here that is likely to 
meet with opposition is the proposal for a European
Defence College. In their statement the quartet argue 
that the creation of such a college would favour the
‘development and spreading of a European security
culture’. However this is not an initiative, which
enjoys the support of member states such as the UK, 
who feel that such an innovation is unnecessary and 
that priority must be given to making the best use of 
existing structures and institutions. 
Breaking new ground? : ‘Concrete initiatives’
In addition to these relatively uncontroversial
proposals, the summit statement outlines several
concrete initiatives, which are intended to reinvigorate
the European defence project. These include the
creation of a rapid reaction capability (to be built
around the Franco-German brigade), a European
command for strategic air transport (with the
possibility of creating at a later date, a common
command for strategic transport – air, land and sea), 
European training centres, a joint European NBC
(Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons)
protection capability and a new humanitarian aid
mechanism (EU-FAST), w hich would facilitate
delivery of aid within 24 hours.
Several of these proposals require clarification. From 
the summit statement it is not clear how any European 
NBC protection capability would be organised or how 
the proposed EU-FAST
2
 humanitarian aid mechanism
would function or what benefits it would offer over 
and above existing aid instruments. However, it seems 
that other member states are not opposed to these ideas 
in principle. Similarly, the proposal to create a rapid
reaction capability that would be made available for
both EU and NATO operations is recognised as a
means of enhancing existing capabilities to meet the
requirements of the EU Rapid Reaction Force.
 More controversial is the proposed European
command for strategic air transport. Critics,
particularly in the UK, question whether such a
command can offer significant benefits over and above 
existing co-ordination mechanisms such as the
European Airlift Co-ordination Cell. Once again the
quartet’s critics are emphasising the need to address
capability shortfalls rather than create new institutions.
A European ‘HQ’: competing with NATO?
The most divisive initiative contained in the statement 
is the proposal to create a ‘nucleus collective
capability for planning and conducting operations for 
the European Union’, effectively a European HQ, to be 
installed at Tervuren by summer 2004. The statement 
maintains that this collective capability would be made 
available to the EU for the conduct of autonomous
operations and could also be used to support the
Deputy Supreme Commander Allied Forces Europe
(DSACEUR) in his role as Commander of EU-led
operations conducted with recourse to NATO assets. 
In order to facilitate both these kinds of operation the 
‘HQ’ would establish liaison links with both its
national counterparts and with Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Such an ‘HQ’ would, 
the statement claims, improve interoperability and
avoid duplication of national resources.
However, critics, notably the UK, argue that the
creation of such an ‘HQ’ would in itself be an
unnecessary duplication given that there are several
national headquarters, including the Permanent Joint
Headquarters at Northwood, which could provide
planning capabilities for the conduct of autonomous
EU operations. Moreover, they argue that progress in 
improving these capabilities is being made under the
European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) and that
the issue should continue to be dealt with within this 
framework.
Given that the US and the UK have always opposed
the establishment of any EU planning capability,
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which could be construed as competing with NATO, it 
is unfortunate that this proposal is being put forward at 
such a sensitive time for transatlantic relations.
Implicit recognition of this fact is evident in the
cautious wording, which states that a decision on the
establishment of the HQ ‘could’ be taken by the end of 
the year. The quartet hopes that this will give them 
time to persuade other member states to join the
initiative. However, it is possible that discussions with 
other member states will persuade the quartet to
reformulate or delay this proposal until broader
consensus can be achieved.
Capability and Credibility
Many of the summit proposals reiterate ideas under
discussion in the Convention. Moreover, it is clear that 
the more controversial elements, particularly the
proposal for an EU planning capability, do not
command the support of more than a small minority of 
states. In their summit statement the quartet argued,
‘Diplomatic action is only credible…if it can be based 
on real civilian and military capabilities’. However,
many critics of the summit argue that an initiative
backed by only four member states is itself scarcely
credible.
What emerges most clearly from this mini-summit is 
that in many areas of defence policy, a clear majority 
of member states are not ready to adopt an
integrationist approach. In their summit statement the 
quartet advocate the creation of a ‘Europe of Security 
and Defence’ based on enhanced co-operation between 
states that are ready to go ‘faster and further’ in
strengthening their defence co-operation. The quartet 
hopes that the incorporation of enhanced co-operation
into the Constitution (as is foreseen in the Convention 
Draft Articles) will enable a group of member states to 
act together as the driving force for ESDP. However, 
the lack of interest from other member states in this 
current initiative indicates that it will be some time
before a significant number of states are willing to put 
themselves in the driving seat.
_____________________________
1 See Catriona Gourlay’s article in this issue.
2 This idea is based on B-FAST (Belgian First Aid and Support 
Team), a humanitarian aid mechanism established in Belgium in 
2000 to facilitate the delivery of aid in emergency situations. 
Catriona Mace
Communiqué on defence equipment: Creating a European armaments policy?
On 11 March 2003, the European Commission 
released its long awaited communiqué1 on industrial
and market aspects of European defence requested by 
the European Parliament in April 2002. It is the third 
such communiqué issued since 1996 and it also picks 
up on many issues raised in the military aerospace 
section of the July 2002 STAR 21 Report.2 Although
previous Commission plans in this area have been 
largely ignored by member states, the new 
Communiqué nevertheless aims to provide a vision for 
creating a viable, sustainable and competitive 
European defence market.
There are two forces currently pushing for greater
armaments co-operation within the EU. The first is an 
argument that recognises that defence spending is
unlikely to rise considerably and that if the equipment 
capability gaps identified by the European Capability
Action Plan (ECAP) process are to be filled,
procurement is going to have to be much more
efficient. This argument concludes that collective
procurement of key items would produce economies of 
scale and scrap duplication of bureaucracy, research
and development and other resources, thus closing the 
capability gaps without large spending increases. The
second is the argument, vigorously pushed by
European defence firms, that if they are to remain
internationally competitive, their home (European)
defence market needs to become more coherent. The
communiqué attempts to respond to both arguments,
however it makes some questionable assumptions,
which have worrying implications. 
The communiqué makes proposals in seven areas:
standardisation, monitoring of defence-related
industries, intra-community transfers, competition,
procurement rules, export control of dual-use goods 
and research. These represent a mixture of thoughtful 
concrete proposals based on existing work and vaguer, 
more political assertions sometimes based on
questionable evidence. Concretely, it plans to produce 
a handbook cataloguing standards commonly used for 
defence procurement by the end of 2004 and launch a 
monitoring exercise of defence-related industries. It
will also assess the impact of a simplified European
licence system for intra-community transfers and
controversially, initiate a pilot project on defence
research related to the Petersberg tasks. Less
concretely, the Commission intends to continue to
reflect on the application of competition rules to the
defence sector and work on optimising European
defence procurement, with the aim of creating a single 
set of procurement rules (presumably these would
incorporate the rules for collaborative projects agreed
within OCCAR
3
).
It will also ask member states to allow it to participate 
in the international dual-use export regimes to ensure 
that firms are not damaged by more restrictive national 
regimes. Finally, the Commission wishes to pursue an 
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EU Defence Equipment Framework, overseen by one 
or more agencies. This would pull together
intergovernmental non-EU initiatives like OCCAR and 
the Framework Agreement on defence industrial
restructuring. It could also use Community instruments 
to tackle issues like off-the-shelf procurement, security 
of supply and facilitating European defence trade. The
proposals though are based on debatable assumptions.
Common ground among member states?
It is questionable whether the member states really
share common ground in this policy area yet. The
Commission appears to be assuming that despite the
unwillingness of member states to adopt the measures 
it suggested in 1996 and 1997, these states will now be 
willing to give up autonomy in armaments policy.
There are however some factors, which suggest
otherwise.
Firstly, although the number of collaborative projects
is increasing, defence procurement is still primarily
carried out at the national level reflecting national
industrial interests. Member states are keen to retain as 
full as possible a range of defence capabilities, and this 
includes defence industrial capabilities. Until now
there has been little sign that even the most pro-
integration states are willing to let the market
determine the size or even existence of their defence
industrial base. Member states also still have different 
strategic priorities resulting in different defence
industrial, arms export, and procurement systems and 
policies.
Secondly, national procurement budgets and defence
industrial capacities still vary dramatically. This means 
that the interests of the larger arms producing states 
and the smaller ones are different. Offset, rigid
workshare and other protectionist measures are hugely 
important to many smaller and medium-sized arms
producers to protect their indigenous industry even
when purchasing from or co-operating with other EU 
states. There is little sign thus far that they are willing 
to relinquish this. Finland and the Netherlands among
others have increased their emphasis on military offset 
to protect their indigenous industry in recent years. 
Where defence firms are still state-owned like in
Finland or Greece proposing a market-led situation
becomes even more complicated and controversial. For 
the larger arms producers these measures are less
important (although they still play a role) within
Europe as they can benefit from the sheer weight of 
their orders and strength of their industry in shaping
any multinational project. Indeed some might argue
that they have too much weight as one large country’s 
decision to pull out or decrease its order can jeopardise 
collaborative projects. Member states  also have the
option of procuring all but major weapons  systems on 
a purely national basis if desired. Thus, while
agreement on building a more coherent defence market 
has long seemed impossible within the EU or West 
European Armaments Group, the likeminded larger
producers were able to make progress within OCCAR
and the Framework Agreement. 
Thirdly, there is no consensus on a European
preference in armaments procurement, as the
Commission appears to assume. States such as Italy, 
Britain and the Netherlands have made it clear that
their defence equipment links with the US remain
important. There is a good case for stating that the US 
defence market is heavily protected and that freer trade 
should exist. In castigating states for participating in
the Joint Strike Fighter programme the Commission
ignores the unwelcome truth that the incentive of
access to both the lucrative US defence market and 
technological advances will remain attractive.
Too shaped by defence industry interests?
The Commission cites cost efficiency of defence
spending, ethics and fairness in the arms trade, security 
of supply and the need to respect Member States’
prerogatives as important considerations in its policy
formulation. Its view however of an EU armaments 
policy appears to be principally based on maintaining a 
competitive defence industrial base and obtaining
better access for EU armaments to third markets. This 
emphasis, given the well-known financial constraints 
on European defence spending and the EU’s desire to 
become a better security actor, needs to be questioned. 
Firstly, it should be underlined that historically
armaments policies oriented primarily towards
maintaining defence industrial interests have not had a 
good record in producing optimal military capacity or 
efficiently produced equipment. There is a tendency
for such policies to result in unnecessarily expensive
(and on occasion inappropriate) military capacities as 
commercial interests tend to favour the procurement of 
ever more complicated successor weapons platforms 
rather than more innovative solutions. 
Equally, the importance of defence research to the
wider economy is no longer as obvious as it once was. 
In fact there is a clear trend emerging which shows the 
military using civilian developed technology, because
civilian technological development is moving at a
faster pace than military research. According to the
Commission’s own estimate in 1996
4
 a third of the
research it then funded was already in dual-use areas.
Is it really in the economic interest of the EU to now 
use its research budget to subsidise pure defence
research?
As there is still defence industrial over-capacity in
Europe, the Commission rightly suggests measures to 
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further consolidation, although care must be taken that 
member states are not faced with quasi-monopoly
suppliers. While the establishment and survival of
large prime contractors is important for the defence
industrial base, the Commission however risks
neglecting the interests of sub-contractors (especially
in key niche technologies) and those paying for,
commissioning and using military equipment. It was
noticeable for example that none of these stakeholders 
were represented on the STAR 21 working group.
Where arms exports are concerned, the communiqué
also seems to emphasise the competitiveness of
European industry ahead of the need for restrictive
arms export regimes. This would represent a
retrograde step, given that the Commission has
previously been at the forefront of efforts to curb lax 
export controls in Europe. Given current worries about
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation
through dual-use exports, the Commission’s fears that 
European firms may be unequally or unnecessarily
constrained by multilateral control regimes, seem
seriously misplaced. 
In conclusion, the communiqué appears to waver
between supporting a protected ‘Fortress Europe’ and 
promoting a free trade approach especially with the
USA. Given that European and American defence
industrial interests are not so easily separated as the
communiqué seems to suggest
5
 surely the latter would 
be a wiser policy, given that Europe cannot afford to 
match American subsidies.
______________________________
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5 See http://defence-data.com/ripley/pagerip1.htm for a 
summary of who owns what. 
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ESR News In Brief
Rhodes Informal Council: toward a European 
‘strategic concept’?
At the Rhodes Informal General Affairs and External 
Relations Council on 2-3 May, the foreign ministers of 
the 25 current and prospective member states of the 
EU discussed the direction ESDP should take in the
face of trans-national threats such as terrorism and
WMD proliferation. In the Council press statement Mr 
Papendreou stated that the EU is in ‘urgent need of a 
European strategic concept’ and announced that
ministers had tasked the High Representative, Javier
Solana with drawing up proposals on how to ‘project
and deepen ESDP’. Ministers also discussed potential 
measures for countering the WMD proliferation
including alternatives to the pre-emptive use of force
such as strengthening multi-lateral fora and weapons 
verification but also examined the merits of
establishing a doctrine for the use of force in the event 
that peaceful enforcement fails.
Publication of road map starts long journey to 
Middle East peace
On 30 April the road map for the re-launch of the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process was finally published
with the stated aim of establishing a permanent two-
state solution to the conflict by the end of 2005. The
road map envisages a three-phase transition to a
permanent settlement sustained by parallel action by
both sides. Although its publication has been
universally welcomed, many remain pessimistic of its 
chances of success. Certainly, a great deal of work will 
be required of the Quartet (EU, Russia, UN, US) in 
assisting with implementation. Following a
preparatory meeting on 5 May the Quartet will hold a 
full meeting on 22-3 May to discuss modalities for 
monitoring progress.
The EP’s vision for ESDP
The European Parliament passed a ‘report on the new 
European security and defence architecture – priorities 
and deficiencies’ on 10 April. The report, drafted by 
Philippe Morillon, MEP, broadly supports the
proposals of the Convention’s working group on
Defence but goes further. It details how a defence
‘avant-garde’ could move faster towards defence
integration; calls for the establishment of a Council of 
Defence Ministers to deal with armaments questions; 
recommends that the European Space Agency become 
an agency of the EU; and calls for the establishment of 
a joint military college and a common EU police force 
and coastguard to protect EU borders. The report also 
proposes that the EP be granted powers to approve, by 
absolute majority, the mandate and objectives of all
EU crisis management operations.
